Tenshinai wrote:
That´s decent enough if you add the "why" to the when and where.
KNick wrote:
Sorry to disagree with you on this one. The "why" had better be decided before you ever start planning strategy. It defines the strategy you are going to use.
Tenshinai wrote:
Uhm... That´s a VERY strange point of view.
Any attack or defense that does not have a strategic "why" is effectively a waste of resources.
If your strategy is based on destroying the enemies ability to build and service ships, then the "why" for as many attacks as possible should be "to destroy shipyards".
I have a feeling you´re mistaking "why go to war" with "why should a specific battle happen".
I’m finding this a very interesting discussion, whenever I have a chance to drop in on it. People are raising very cogent points, and the different way in which people parse the difference between strategy and tactics is fascinating. Obviously, I’m not going to tell you who falls where on my lists in these various categories.
For myself, I tend to divide the “art of war” into:
Grand Strategy: this is where national objectives are set and where all of the resources — military, diplomatic, economic, industrial, information, etc. — are utilized. The object of grand strategy is to determine what needs to be accomplished and how best to orchestrate all of those resources to the achievement of that/those objective(s). The grand strategists are supposed to be the ones to know what they have to work with, know what needs to be done, decide who to assign to do the doing, and prioritize competing theaters and goals at the highest level.
Theater Strategy: this might also be called “Campaign Strategy.” This is where people assigned by the grand strategists to accomplish specific goals go about accomplishing them. The sorts of issues they need to deal with might be “how do we win the war against the U-boats in the Atlantic” or “how do we deploy strategic air power against Germany” or “how do we invade France” or “how do we take the war to Japan through the Central Pacific.” Planning for those sorts of campaigns/operations takes place at this level, but so does execution and coordination.
Operational: this is the level where individual commanders within a theater or campaign strategy have to accomplish the tasks they are assigned. This would be the point at which a corps commander or a divisional commander or a fleet commander looks at his assigned mission and his resources and whatever support might be available from assets not under his direct command and decides how he’s going to apply them.
Tactical: this is the level where the battles are actually fought. This is the point at which unit movements decide the outcome of the engagement. For an army, this would traditionally involve units below the regimental level; for a fleet commander things are going to be a little different (usually) because individual warships (which would be the equivalent of the “regimental level or below”) don’t usually maneuver as individuals, but rather as components of a task force or a squadron.
This is horribly simplified, of course, and I’m sure people could pick all sorts of holes in it because it contains certain assumptions on my part that are so fundamental I don’t see any need to explicate them more fully.
As far as Honor’s abilities at the tactical, operational, strategic, and grand strategic levels (as I’ve defined them above) are concerned, I think it should be borne in mind that just as we haven’t had a chance to see Caparelli perform at the tactical level, we haven’t seen Honor have a chance to perform equally at all levels. She’s only really been admitted to the strategy/grand strategy level in the last two or three “Honor” books, and I sometimes think when someone’s performed outstandingly at a lower level in my hierarchy, people tend to consider them failures at a
higher level unless they perform at least equally
or even more spectacularly.
Not saying she's not /good/, just that she's not the best or near-best.
